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The concept of “divided government” is more complicated than scholars
have allowed. In the USA, truly unified government, where the president
enjoys a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate as well as a majority in the
House, is rare. In France, truly unified government has been more common,
but divided government has also occurred several times. Democratic gov-
ernance requires that parties address important issues and they do so
regardless of the patterns of institutional control. Nevertheless, policy
changes or important laws are affected by the higher level of institutional
friction associated with divided government. Looking at both the USA and
France, we find that periods of unified government show higher levels of
production of important laws in the USA, but we find no difference for
overall legislative productivity.
Introduction
In earlyAugust 2011, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives,
the Democratic-controlled Senate, and President Barack Obama finally
agreed on a compromise to increase the debt ceiling just hours before a
federal payment default. The divided government (henceforth DG) pro-
duced by the 2010 election proved able to cope with this issue but only
when faced with a major economic crisis. This recent story perfectly exem-
plifies how lawmaking is affected by DG. Lawmaking requires more time
and energy than under unified government, but it does not render gov-
ernment impossible. DG has often been seen as leading to stalemate
(Binder 1999; Edwards, Barrett, and Peake 1997; Tsebelis 2004) or con-
versely as neutral on legislative productivity (Conley 2007; Mayhew 1991).
The article will distinguish various forms of DG. A strict definition of
DG is a political situation where the governing party must cooperate with
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at least some members of the opposition party in order to legislate. By
this definition, most so-called unified governments have actually been
divided, and strictly unified governments have been exceedingly rare. In
fact, some form of DG is the norm in the USA. It clarifies a concept that
most studies of DG in the USA simply defined as split-party control of the
presidency and Congress, without clarifyingwhether a split Congress was
part of or foreign to the concept. Second, it allows extending the concept to
other political systems. In that regard, we compare the USA to one of the
few other Western systems where DG occurs: France.
Legislating is to a large extent problem solving (Adler and Wilkerson
2012; Jones and Baumgartner 2005).As there is a constant flow of problems
to solve, and as all sides of the political spectrum bring their attention to
new issues from time to time, policymakers seek solutions to new issues
on a continual basis, regardless of institutional control. Of course, DGmay
make compromise more difficult, but this should affect major policy
changes much more than routine adjustments. We expect that DG should
have no effect on overall levels of legislative productivity, only on land-
mark pieces of legislation. Our empirical results clearly demonstrate that if
DG does not imply general legislative gridlock, it does render important
policy change more difficult.
Defining DG in the USA and France
The USA
The most prominent study of DG in the USA, and the book that launched
an entire literature on this topic (Mayhew 1991), underscores the com-
monplace nature of DG in the USA, as exemplified by its title: Divided We
Govern. Strictly unified government requires the president’s party to
control a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and to have a majority in
the House. Only in this case, the presidential party is not dependent on the
cooperation of (a part of) the opposition party to legislate. By contrast,
there is only formally unified government when the president has a major-
ity in the Senate but that majority is not filibuster-proof. In fact, the
postwar period has seen only six years of “strictly unified government”—
four of the Kennedy–Johnson years (1963–1966 when Democrats held
between 66 and 68 seats in the Senate), and Jimmy Carter’s first two years
in office (when Democrats held 61 seats). No Republican president has
ever enjoyed such control.1
We make this distinction and believe it affects important legislation but
not routine lawmaking because as long as the president must contend
with a potential filibuster, then any significant legislation will require at
least some interparty cooperation and compromise. Formally unified gov-
ernment has been the rule for 18 years over the postwar period. The most
common situation has been DG, which in the USA can be either weak or
strong depending on whether the party of the president holds a majority
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in one of the chambers (weak) or in none (strong). Strong or weak DG has
been the case for 35 of the 59 years we analyze in this article, with most of
those being strongly divided. Thus, one can see that the president faces a
hostile majority in at least one chamber, and usually both, most of the
time. This is the natural or most common order of things in the USA in the
postwar period. Mayhew’s title, Divided We Govern, fits the data perfectly.
France
The situation in France is not quite the same as the USA but does not differ
as much as sometimes thought, nor as clearly as a simple dichotomy
would suggest. Both countries have a bicameral legislature and a directly
elected president, but France also has a divided executive. Attention in
France has focused on DG in the form of cohabitation—when the president
and the primeminister are partisan rivals—but as in the USA, the situation
is more complicated than a simple dichotomy. Whereas in the USA, the
executive cannot be divided, in France, both the legislature and the execu-
tive may be divided or unified, creating four possible situations (Siaroff
2003). Only the National Assembly and the prime minister are certain to
belong to the same partisan camp.
French deputies and senators are elected according to different elec-
toral systems: Representatives or députés are elected by direct suffrage
according to a two-round majoritarian system; senators are elected by an
electoral college made up of the députés and various local elected repre-
sentatives. Thus, both chambers may or may not be controlled by the same
parties or coalition. Therefore, we define divided and unified legislatures
by whether or not there is shared control of the NationalAssembly and the
Senate by the left- and right-wing parties. Even if until very recently the
Senate has never been under control of the political left,2 it has been in
the opposition several times during the Fifth Republic (1958–1968). A
right-wing majority controlled the Senate when the presidency was held
by Socialist F. Mitterrand (1981–1995) as well as when the NationalAssem-
bly was controlled by a left-wing coalition (1981–1986 and 1988–1993).
The parliamentary character of the semi-presidential system implies
that the prime minister (and the cabinet) and the lower chamber will
always belong to the same coalition: The prime minister must have the
confidence of the Assembly. In fact, the rationalized parliamentarism in
place at least until 2009 has allowed a tight control of the parliamentary
agenda by the cabinet (Brouard 2011; Huber 1992). We will call opposition
a party or a coalition of parties that is not part of the coalition supporting
the cabinet.
Table 1 shows the possible combinations of unified and divided control
in France.
Table 1 features the four theoretical possibilities of power distribution.
The four quadrants match real-world cases. Unified government occurred
mostly at the beginning and at the end of the period under scrutiny
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(1974–1981, 1995–1997, 2002–2007). Unified executive and divided legis-
lature happened during the Mitterrand presidency when a left-wing coa-
lition held a majority in the lower house, but the Senate was dominated by
conservatives (1981–1986 and 1988–1993). A divided executive and a
unified legislature characterized the two periods of cohabitation under
Mitterrand’s presidency, when he was confronted with a right-wing
cabinet, Assembly, and Senate (1986–1988 and 1993–1995). Finally, the
pinnacle of DG was reached between 1997 and 2002 when both the legis-
lature and the executive branches were divided. Right-wing President
Chirac and the Senate were in opposition to a left-wing cabinet and
National Assembly. Just as in the USA, where the patterns of DG are more
complicated than a simple dichotomy would suggest, so too in France the
simple unified versus cohabitation situation does not capture the full range
of situations that have occurred. These are not just academic distinctions;
our analysis shows they have substantial impacts on the production of
important laws.
A more complete definition of DG allows us to incorporate how impor-
tant elements of the institutional powers of the French presidency and of
the Senate can affect the lawmaking process. Concerning presidential
powers, the constitutional text does not set the foundations for presiden-
tial supremacy in policymaking. In fact, the Constitution reserves impor-
tant powers for the government. Under Article 20, “the government shall
determine and conduct the policy of the Nation.” Nevertheless, although
it has no legal basis—the notion does not appear in any official text—the
domaine réservé constitutes a regulatory mechanism for the relation both
within the executive and between the executive and legislative branches
(Irondelle 2009). According to this tradition, the president is to play a
preeminent role in defense and foreign policy. Even if the “reserved
domain” has become more and more a “shared domain” (Balme 2009;
Irondelle 2009), the presidential predominance in these two fields has
operated all along the Fifth Republic, even during the three experiences of
divided executive. As a result, the president has an effective, if informal,
veto power in those two policy areas (Leuffen 2009). A hostile government
will be less inclined to take into account presidential preferences in other
policy areas. Nevertheless, the president may slow down the legislative
TABLE 1
Patterns of Government Control in France
Divided Legislature Unified Legislature
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process using different institutional tools such as: asking for a new
reading of the law,3 refusing to sign ordinances, or refusing the opening of
supplementary parliamentary sessions. The president might also use the
strategy of “going public” to increase the level of contention and embar-
rass the government in an effort to abort policy changes.
The effect of policy types on law production is also related to the
institutional powers of the French Senate. The most important impact of
the Senate during divided legislature periods is to delay the usual law-
making process. The Senate was comparatively active, under the third
cohabitation, when President Chirac encouraged the conservative majority
in the Sénat to counter the Socialist majority of Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin in the Assemblée (Verdier 1998). In addition to this power to delay,
the Senate may de facto veto constitutional laws and organic laws4 dealing
with the Senate.
In summary, in France, both the executive and the legislature can be
divided.As for the USA, we consider that strictly unified government only
applies when the majority party does not require the cooperation of the
opposition party to pass legislation. Thus, most of the so-called unified
governments are in reality only formally unified. DG in France, according
to this definition, also expands well beyond what is traditionally called
cohabitation. From 1978 through 2007, the period under study, strictly
unified governments were in place under Giscard (1978–1981) and Chirac
(1995–1997 and again 2002–2007). PresidentMitterrand experienced either
formally unified government with a hostile Senate (1981–1986 and 1988–
1993) or a strongly divided government facing two opposing chambers
(1986–1988 and 1993–1995). President Chirac had two periods of strictly
unified government (1995–1997 and 2002–2007) and one period of strongly
divided government, as his coalition retained control of the Senate but lost
the Assembly and therefore the prime minister’s office (1997–2002).
The USA and France Compared
Figure 1 illustrates the complications associated with the labels “unified”
and “divided” in both countries. Part A shows the USA. For each presi-
dent since Truman, the dark shadings indicate strongly divided govern-
ment, lighter shadings show periods of weakly divided or what we have
called formally unified government, and the white areas are the ones with
a president enjoying a filibuster-proof Senate majority (strictly unified
government). Lines show the level of the president’s party’s support in the
House and Senate, and the horizontal, dotted and dashed lines indicate
the critical majority point in the House and the filibuster point in the
Senate. Our definitions of divided and unified government relate to
whether the partisan composition of the House and Senate are above or
below those critical lines.
Part B shows the situation for France. The percentage of seats controlled
by the president’s coalition is shown in comparison with the 50% line, and
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shadings represent the combinations of possible situations as described
above. As we can see, each country experiences each of our newly defined
types of unified and divided government during our period of study.
Furthermore, periods of strictly unified government are rare.
Given that large blocks of time in both countries are characterized by
some level of shared control, it would indeed be surprising if leaders were
unable to produce legislation except in the scarce periods of strictly unified
government. However, before turning to the presentation of our data, we
turn first to what other scholars have said about legislative productivity
in DG.
Legislative and Policy Effects of DG
Debates on the effects of DG on policy outputs have largely been domi-
nated by Mayhew’s contribution in the USA. Similar debates exist in
France. We put forth an original perspective based on a punctuated-
equilibrium perspective.
FIGURE 1
Periods of Divided and Unified Government: A. USA; B. France
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Mayhew and Beyond
Mayhew’s contribution to the analysis of DG sparked lasting debates
(McKay 1994; for early reviews, see Brady 1993). Unlike many other
contributions (Alesina and Rosenthal 1996; Fiorina 1996; Laver 1999),
Mayhew was not interested in the origins of DG in the USA. Rather, he
proposed to test a piece of accepted wisdom on U.S. political life: that DG
is detrimental to decision-making efficiency. According to that assump-
tion, unified government is more conducive to the enactment of major
legislation than DG. Mayhew proved this argument wrong showing that
DG and unified government present highly similar patterns of legislative
productivity. In order to do so, his analysis relied in particular on a list of
“important legislation.” His analysis concluded that important legislation
was more constrained by “surges,” that is, periods of overactivism, than
by the institutional and political context.
Following Mayhew’s analysis of major legislation, a first group of
authors reexamined and questioned Mayhew’s list of major bills. Espe-
cially, his post hoc methodology for constructing the list of major legisla-
tion (“sweep two”) was criticized by many as being largely independent
from the immediate political context. Some of those analyses showed some
partisan effect using reorganized versions of Mayhew’s data (Coleman
1999; Howell et al. 2000).
An original contribution by Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) showed
that the effect of DG was more visible if one takes into account major
pieces of legislation that failed rather than those that passed. They showed
that presidents are more likely to veto legislation under DG than under
unified government. Binder (1999) showed that under DG, laws are less
likely to address the main issues of the time. Other criticisms concerned
the lack of consideration for the variety of situations that the term “DG”
covers and/of for certain institutional rules, such as the need for a super-
majority to avoid filibustering in the Senate (Coleman 1999). Finally, some
authors argued that the role of parties had to figure more prominently in
the analysis (Chiou and Rothenberg 2003). In particular, intraparty frac-
tionalization, or party-internal divisions, should be as important as DG
(Binder 1999; Thorson 1998). Beyond the mere question of legislative
productivity, Mayhew’s work has had a lasting influence, even on the
many works that maintain that DG does affect output negatively.
In France, the debate has been equally heated in the public sphere, but
weaker in academic circles. The essential reason is that France has expe-
rienced cohabitation for only 9 out of 51 years since the creation of the Fifth
Republic. It is true that all periods of DGs occurred within the past 25
years. However, it should also be noted that the constitutional reform of
2000, which brought the presidential mandate in line with the mandate of
the legislature, should weaken the chances of DG, at least for the foresee-
able future (Grossman and Sauger 2009). Independent from this constitu-
tional revision, the fact that France has experienced significant periods
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of DG allows us to broaden the tests of the effect of DG on legislative
productivity beyond the U.S. case which so far has dominated the
literature.
Early on, French political scientists feared the occurrence of DG—or
cohabitation as it would later be coined—as they considered France to be
unfit for this. It was only in 1986, that is, 28 years after the creation of the
Fifth Republic, that it eventually occurred. The French constitution was
ambiguous on the relative powers of the premier and the president in the
case of DG, and it appears that the framers of the constitution of 1958 gave
little thought to the possibility of leftist control. This seemed in fact very
unlikely at the time. However, in retrospect, with different timing of
presidential and legislative elections, any shift in power from right to left
would make at least a short period of cohabitation mathematically
unavoidable.
There are few empirical studies of the policy outputs associated with
French DG. Most existing studies have, moreover, been conducted by
legal scholars, several of whom have undertaken important in-depth
analyses (Cohendet 1993) and found that it has little impact on legislative
productivity. Only few political scientists have openly addressed the issue,
focusing on the origins and institutional tensions rather than on policy
outputs (Parodi 1997, 2002). The few studies that exist have mainly been
realized by non-French scholars and rely on case studies. Conley (2011)
recently analyzed French legislative productivity and concluded: “In and
of itself cohabitation does not affect productivity” (p. 173).
Finally, veto player theory (Tsebelis 1999) applied to DG predicts grid-
lock. The underlying logic is straightforward when applied to the USA.
Under unified government, there is only one veto player, whereas under
DG there are at least two. Moreover, as the number and/or the distance
between veto players increases, the policy space jointly preferred by veto
players to the status quo quickly shrinks to zero. More precisely, the
prediction is that DG should be associated with higher policy stability. The
theory was tested comparatively but only on a short span of time and only
in the domain of labor legislation in parliamentary systems (including
France) (Tsebelis 1995, 1999, 2004). We provide a larger scale test here.
Toward a New Perspective on DG
Our own take relies on the punctuated equilibrium approach (see Jones
and Baumgartner 2005) and the problem-solving one (Adler and
Wilkerson 2012). Governments in all countries are constantly bombarded
with a greater number of problems, some of them outright crises, than
they can possibly resolve. Attention shifts from topic to topic as domestic
actors mobilize, as external crises force issues onto the agenda, and for a
variety of other reasons. For example, Baumgartner, Brouard, and
Grossman (2009) showed that the policy domains in which successive
presidents and governments of the left and right in France have legislated
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have not been systematically different from one another. Governing is
unlike campaigning; governments do not have the luxury of picking and
choosing all the issues they address. Of course, they may inflect activities
one way or another to reflect their priorities. However, little research so far
has addressed squarely the relative importance of those issues that can be
manipulated, picked, or chosen, as opposed to those that governments
simply cannot avoid and that are forced upon the governmental agenda by
exogenous events (Adler and Wilkerson 2012). Christopher Green-
Pedersen and Peter Mortensen (2010) have shown that members of the
parliamentary opposition may focus their questions on those issues most
likely to embarrass the government but that the government cannot
simply ignore these questions, especially once the media take interest.
Because elections are permanently on the horizon, leaders also seek
accomplishments that they can take to the voters in order to claim their
continued support. For the same reason, we can hypothesize that, what-
ever the balance of power, problems must be addressed. Legislation is
therefore passed under DG. For example, if the European Union (EU)
requires France to pass new legislation to be in compliance with a new
Brussels directive, it makes little difference whether the executive is in a
period of unified or shared control. In the USA, if the Farm Bill is up for
renewal because it included a sunset provision, DG will not stop the
president and the Congress from reaching a new agreement.5 If legislation
is in response to external crises, recurring legislation that must be
renewed, or to the demands of external actors such as the EU, there should
be no effect of DG.
Nevertheless, who is in power and the pattern of government control
certainly affects the content of legislation. Beyond the nature of the policy
itself, we also mean the level of policy change. We expect DG to affect
the content of policy because it forces those in power to negotiate more
intensely and to reach a more difficult compromise than would be neces-
sary if the executive could simply ignore opposition parties in the legisla-
ture. Put simply, DG increases the cost of policy change. Several studies
show that increased institutional friction leads to less policy change (e.g.,
Jones, Larson-Price, andWilkerson 2009). Friction increases when decision
making becomes more complex or costly. Therefore, we expect DG to
decrease policy change. Conversely, the structural bias toward the status
quo and incremental changes is reinforced by DG for two reasons. Atten-
tion scarcity implies that if policy change is more costly in time and energy,
then fewer policies should see major adjustment under DG. Policy dis-
agreementmight also explainwhy some policy changes are not possible: If
the existing policy is located between the policy preferences of themajority
and the opposition, the most likely agreement between both sides is
the status quo. E. Balladur, right-wing French prime minister under left-
wing President F. Mitterrand, illustrates this point: “We [Balladur and
Mitterrand] were not in agreement on everything. In that case, the
status quo was preserved; the status quo, that is the policies that had been
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defined before my appointment as head of the government” (Balladur
1995, 81). A concrete example is the extension of voting rights in
local elections for non-EU foreigners. This long-standing priority of left-
wing parties has never been implemented because the left has never
governed in strictly unified government, and right-wing parties have
always vetoed it.
Thus, we do not expect a strong effect of DG on the level of legislative
productivity, but we expect a strong negative one on the level of policy
change. DG should lead to as many minor adjustments as in unified
government but to fewer pieces of major legislation.
Data Sets and Measures
The French and American policy agendas projects provide the data to test
the above arguments. U.S. data are available for the period of 1948–2006
from http://www.policyagendas.org and have been supplemented with
various public sources for such variables as the size of the legislative
majorities. French data span the period of 1974–2008 and come from
the French agendas project (http://www.agendas-france.fr), similarly
supplemented with public election results data.
Dependent Variables
Number of Laws. As we are interested in the impact of DG on law produc-
tion, we first estimate their effect the on number of laws passed.6 The
number of laws promulgated in France between 1979 and 2008 is 2,830. In
the USA, it is 12,115 for the period of 1948–2006. Graphical and statistical
analyses of the number of laws reveal that especially in the USA, there are
problems with the stationarity of the data, a point we will address in the
analysis section. Figure 2 shows the production of laws over time in the
two countries.
Key Laws. Second, we use a measure of key laws as a proxy for policy
change. We look for external signs of “importance” rather than looking for
directional information, which is more subjective and often less reliable.
We build on the approach originally developed by Mayhew. In the USA,
we use the most important laws from the Policy Agendas Project that is
based on the amount of coverage in the annual Congressional Quarterly
Almanac. For France, there is no preexistingmeasure. We develop our own
measure of key laws, which are laws that have intrinsic institutional con-
sequences as well as laws that are considered significant by key political
actors, namely, the government and its majority and/or the opposition.
Because constitutional laws are laws that modify the institutional structure
of the country, we count all constitutional laws as key laws. For the
same reason, we include all lois référendaires (i.e., laws dealing with the
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organization of the state, the economic, social or environmental policy of
the nation, or the institutional framework of the nation), that is, laws that
must be ratified by referendum.
We also include laws that have been enacted by applying the “guillo-
tine” or the urgency procedures of the Constitution (i.e., Articles 49.3 and
45.2). By using one of these two procedures (guillotine and urgency) on a
bill, the government expresses the fact that this bill is an essential piece of
FIGURE 2
Number of Statutes per Year in the USA and France: A. USA;
B. France
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its agenda. Finally, we count as key laws those organic laws7 and ordinary
laws that have been adopted by public vote or ordinary laws that have
been referred for a constitutional review before their promulgation.8 Each
of these two actions (public vote on an ordinary or organic law, referral of
an ordinary law to the Constitutional Council) reveals that the law is
considered important by the majority and/or the opposition. The public
vote has previously been used as an indicator of importance (Lazardeux
2009) because it is recognized as such by the main actors involved in the
legislative process. The information services of the National Assembly
note: “The use of a public vote allows, on topics of acknowledged signifi-
cance, to record the position of each member of the assembly. . . . The
Conference of Presidents9 has therefore followed the custom, on the most
important texts, to organize a solemn vote that takes the form of a public
vote at a date and time that maximizes the presence of deputies.”10 The
public vote specifically provides a useful instrument for each camp to
publicly differentiate its policy preferences from those of the other camp
in front of its electorate. The referral of a law to the constitutional council
also has electoral underpinnings as its represents a way for the minority to
signal to its electorate its willingness to fight the most significant policy
proposals of the governing majority (Brouard 2009).
Table 2 summarizes the number of key laws in the French case. From a
total of 2,764 laws, 846 are considered “most important” in the analysis
below. Graphical (Figure 3) and statistical analyses of the number of key
laws only show cyclical patterns in both countries.
Our use of simple counts of laws and key laws raises some possible
concerns of measurement validity. For example, during times of DG,
leaders might potentially bundle several key pieces of legislation into an
TABLE 2
Constructing a List of Most Important Laws for France
Type of Law “Most Important” Laws Other Laws
Constitutional laws 18 0
Lois référendairesa 3 0
Organic laws 19 51
Ordinary laws 779 766
Treaties and Conventions 77 1,101
Total 846 1,918
Note: All constitutional and referendary laws are considered to be important, by definition.
For organic laws, they must be adopted by public vote or by the use of article 49.3. For
ordinary laws, they must be adopted by public vote, using urgency (45.2), the guillotine
(49.3), or referred to the constitutional council. Treaties and conventions are counted as major
laws according to the same rules as above: if they are subject to articles 45.2 or 49.3 or referred
to the constitutional council.
aLaws that were adopted by referendum are classified as Lois référendaires even if they are
de jure constitutional laws, organic laws, etc.
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omnibus bill. However, no theory suggests a systematic bias in the use of
this procedure under divided or unified government. In fact, it would be
unlikely under true unified government as there are no incentives to
package legislation as such; it would also be unlikely under DG as it is
difficult to stabilize a bargain in amultidimensional environment. J. Huber
(1996) shows that in France when laws are multidimensional, restrictive
rules are used more frequently, reflecting the greater difficulty of reaching
FIGURE 3
Number of Key Laws: A. USA; B. France
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a stable equilibrium. Beyond these theoretical reasons for not expecting
bundling of diverse proposals into fewer larger pieces of legislation
during DG, a quick review of the length of French laws shows that this is
not a concern. From 1990 to 2008, there were 185 key laws passed during
periods of strictly unified government, and these averaged approximately
83,000 characters, whereas the 242 key laws passed under other forms of
government averaged only 49,000 characters. For all laws (not counting
ratifications of international agreements, which are highly similar in scope
no matter the form of government), laws under strictly unified govern-
ment average 43,000 characters, with laws passed under all other forms
averaged about 30,000. Thus, we have both theoretical and empirical
grounds to be confident that we need not worry that DG leads to fewer,
but longer, pieces of legislation.
Independent Variables
Divided Government. Because we believe that DG actually aggregates very
different institutional situations under the same conceptual frame, we
have chosen to test the effect of DG as it is commonly understood as well
as our more complete operationalization. For France, we examine four
possible configurations of government control: strictly unified govern-
ment (when the president has a majority in the Senate and in theAssembly
and therefore a prime minister from his own party coalition), formally
unified government (when only the Senate is in the opposition), weakly
divided government (when only the president is in the opposition), and
strongly divided government (when the president does not control the
Assembly, and therefore not the cabinet either, but has a majority in the
Senate). For the USA, we also test the effect of four configurations: strictly
unified government (president with a filibuster-proof Senate and a major-
ity in the House), formally unified government (president without a
filibuster-proof Senate), weakly divided government (president in the
minority in one chamber), and strongly divided (president opposed by
both chambers).
Election Years. For France, we expect that elections will have a strong
negative impact on legislative activity as legislative elections disrupt the
normal course of the legislature. For the USA, elections are part of the
normal two-year cycle of legislative work so we do not posit an election
effect. In fact, years with elections typically have a higher level of produc-
tivity, but this is because of the calendar of legislative work, with the year
before an election also being the second session of the Congress; in most
two-year Congresses, more hearings and investigations occur in the first
year and more laws are passed in the second year.
Ideological Cohesiveness and Distance. As we mentioned earlier, the veto
model of legislative productivity (Krehbiel 1998; Tsebelis 1995, 2004)
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points to the importance of variation in the ideological position of veto
players in expanding or contracting the space for policy change. We there-
fore examine the ideological distance between the majority and the oppo-
sition (distance) during DG as well as the ideological distance within the
majority (cohesiveness).
We call cohesiveness the measure of the intramajority ideological dis-
tance. Cohesiveness indicates the standard deviation from the weighted


















where Ipi is the ideological position of partyi and Mpi is the number of seats
held by partyi.
Cohesiveness represents the deviation from this mean. Hence,














Conceptually, this measures if the parties of a coalition are concentrated
around the ideological mean of the coalition or if there is a strong devia-
tion from the mean position among those who make up the governing
coalition. The expectation is that a larger deviation will decrease law
production. We adapt this measure to the USA by using the standard
deviation from the mean of the majority party using Bailey’s (2007) data.
We also examine the effect of the ideological distance between the
majority and the opposition on law production during DG. We measure
this distance as the ideological distance between the majority and oppo-
sition party(ies) on the left–right scale of the Party Manifesto database
weighted by the number of seats held by both camps. For France, we use
Lazardeux’s (2009) data. For the USA, we use Bailey’s (2007) measure and
calculate the distance between the weighted mean score of the Republican
and Democratic parties for each Congress. This distance measure allows
us to compare situations in which DG requires a “far reach” across the
partisan divide versus those where the partisan division is relatively
minor.
Session and Session Length. Finally, we add to control variables to take into
account the specificities of the organization of legislative work in the two
countries. In the USA, the two years between every legislative election
typically show a see-saw pattern where the first year (or session) shows
more hearings but fewer laws and the second session of a Congress shows
more legislative productivity (and fewer hearings). This seasonality must
be accounted for so we include a dummy variable called “session,” which
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takes the value 1 in election years and 0 otherwise. The French case
presents a slightly different problem: the variable length of parliamentary
sessions. The possibility to call for “extraordinary sessions” has been
resorted to rather systematically in the past few years, thereby lengthening
the average length of parliamentary sessions. Election years are an excep-
tion from that perspective. They are on average about half as long as
parliamentary sessions in nonelection years. Yet, those years feature a
higher legislative productivity, in terms of the average number of laws
adopted divided by session length, measured in days. In order to account
for this peculiarity, we add the absolute length of the parliamentary
session (measured in days) as a control variable to the French models.
Summarizing, our article will test four main hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The problem-solving (or null) hypothesis: Patterns of government control
do not affect law production.
Hypothesis 2: The friction hypothesis: When decision making is more complex due to
the patterns of government control, policy change (number of key laws) decreases.
Hypothesis 3: The veto player–internal cohesiveness hypothesis: When ideological
cohesiveness of a governing party (or coalition) decreases, law production and policy
change decrease.
Hypothesis 4: The veto player–polarization hypothesis: When ideological distance
between majority and opposition increases during DG, law production and policy
change decrease.
Results
Table 3 presents the rate of legislative productivity according to the dif-
ferent definitions of patterns of government control.
Table 3 shows no significant effect of the various definitions of DG on
the number of laws in the USA. Indeed, weakly divided governments have
the greatest legislative productivity. The pattern is different regarding
important laws, as they are more likely to be passed during strictly unified
government. The difference between strictly unified and strictly divided is
statistically significant (P = 0.01). On average, about 60% more important
laws are promulgated under strictly unified governments as compared to
strictly divided ones. Although the strict definitions produce statistically
distinguishable differences, the traditional definition of DG (strictly and
formally unified vs. weakly and strictly divided) fails to show important
or significant differences. Strictly unified government is always signifi-
cantly associated with the highest number of key laws.11 Beyond this, there
is no consistent pattern. These results from the USA are congruent with
our expectations regarding the definition of DG and its effect of the leg-
islative production and policy changes.
For France, Table 3 shows roughly similar results concerning the
average number of laws per month.12 Under cohabitation (or divided
executive), that is, the common definition of DG in France, the number of
438 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL.
laws passed is actually slightly higher than under a unified executive.
Conversely, we find the most important difference to be between unified
and divided legislatures. Departing from the U.S. case, the average
number of important laws does not show a clear pattern. The highest
production of important laws is under weakly divided government when
the president is alone in the opposition. No matter which definition of
unified government adopted, we do not observe a significant increase in
the number of important laws. However, the production of key laws is at
its minimum under strongly divided government quite in line with results
for the United Kingdom.
In Tables 4 and 5, we move beyond the simple averages. The tables
present negative binomial models for rates of legislative productivity; the
dependent variables are the total number of laws, as described in the first
columns of Table 3.
As expected, the policymaking cycle in Congress gives rise to more
laws during the second, or electoral, year of each congressional term. If
distance has no independent impact, the coefficient is systematically nega-
tive (reaching statistical significance only once) when interacted with DG,
indicating that increases in political polarization under DG are detrimen-
tal to law production. Most importantly, none of the various operational-
izations of DG significantly affects overall law production.13 The three
models presented show the impact of different ways of thinking of DG.
Model 1 presents “divided,” which is the broadest definition: anything
TABLE 3
Legislative Productivity under Divided and Unified Government
Government Status Laws Important Laws
A. USAa
Strictly unified 244.0 17.0
Strictly divided 201.0 10.5
Weakly and strongly divided 196.6 10.5
Strictly and formally unified 218.1 12.7
Formally unified 209.5 10.6
Weakly divided 276.4 5.9
Strongly divided 172.9 12.0
B. Franceb
Unified executive 35.3 13.9
Divided executive 36.5 13.0
Unified legislature 41.7 14.2
Divided legislature 29.4 13.0
Formally unified 30.7 16.4
Weakly divided 44.7 19.3
Strongly divided 26.6 5.5
aValues reported are averages per year.
bValues reported are averages per month during which Parliament was in session.
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but the case where the president controls the House as well as a filibuster-
proof majority. Model 2 presents a more traditional definition, “weakly
and strongly divided,” where the president is opposed by a majority
in one or two chambers, respectively. Finally, Model 3 presents each
level of DG separately: formally unified (presidential majorities, but
subject to a possible filibuster in the Senate), weakly divided (opposition
controls one chamber of Congress), and strongly divided (president
opposed by both the House and Senate). None of the DG coefficients is
significant.
Table 5 shows a similar presentation for France. We present four
models because the possible types of DG are slightly more complicated
there, as discussed in the text. The insignificant coefficients for each way of
operationalizing DG mirror the results for the USA. The only significant
coefficients are those for election years and length of parliamentary ses-
sions. Moreover, neither cohesiveness nor distance between opposition
and majority affect law production in France.
If Tables 4 and 5 show no impact of DG for legislative productivity
overall, Tables 6 and 7, which present identical models for the production
of major laws, reveal important negative effects for DG in both countries.
Table 6 shows the results for the USA. In each of the three models, the
various ways of measuring DG all show a large and significant negative
effect. Furthermore, Model 3 shows that, compared to strictly unified
TABLE 4
Predicting Legislative Production in the USA, 1948–2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 5.49*** (0.21) 5.48*** (0.21) 5.6*** (0.24)
Time -0.03*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00) -0.02*** (0.00)
Session 0.49*** (0.07) 0.5*** (0.07) 0.5*** (0.06)
Divided -0.11 (0.11)
Weakly and strongly div. -0.04 (0.07)
Formally unified -0.1 (0.12)
Weakly divided -0.03 (0.12)
Strongly divided -0.16 (0.11)
Cohesiveness 0.16 (0.19) 0.2 (0.19) 0.12 (0.19)
Divided * Distance -0.12* (0.05) -0.14 (0.14) -0.15** (0.05)
AIC 52.78 52.79 52.64
-2 log-likelihood 558 557 559
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.23 0.23 0.23
N 50 50 50
Note: Entries represent negative binomial coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The
omitted (baseline) category for the USA is strictly unified government (where the president
has not only a majority in both chambers, but a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate). The
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable does not affect the results presented above but
increases the pseudo-R2.
***P < 0.001; **P < 0.01; *P < 0.05
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government, each of the various forms of DG has a negative sign and is
significant, even if there is no consistent ordering to the value of the
coefficients. Distance has a significant negative impact only when the
various types of DG are distinguished.
TABLE 5
Predicting Legislative Production in France, 1979–2008
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 3.49*** (0.24) 3.37*** (0.22) 3.38*** (0.23) 3.33*** (0.18)
Session length 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Leg. election -0.18* (0.10) -0.18* (0.10) -0.18* (0.10) -0.17* (0.10)
Divided 0.10 (0.26)
Divided executive 0.22 (0.30)
Divided legislature 0.15 (0.27)
Formally unified gov. -0.41 (0.49)
Weakly divided gov. -0.08 (0.36)
Strongly divided gov. 0.09 (0.24)
Distance -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)
Cohesiveness 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.02)
Divided * Distance 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
AIC 35.11 35.2 35.06 36.21
-2 loglikelihood 298 298 298 299
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
N 33 33 33 33
Note: Entries represent negative binomial coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The dependent
variable is the number of key laws per month of parliamentary session.
***P < 0.001; **P < 0.01; *P < 0.05
TABLE 6
Predicting Policy Change in the USA, 1948–2006
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 1.33** (0.44) 1.47** (0.46) 1.84*** (0.45)
Time 0.01** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.01* (0.00)





Formally unified -0.42* (0.20)
Weakly divided -1*** (0.24)
Strongly divided -0.39* (0.19)
Cohesiveness 0.62 (0.40) 0.7 (0.40) 0.72 (0.37)
Divided * Distance -0.08 (0.09) -0.11 (0.10) -0.08 (0.09)
AIC 50.96 50.51 49.91
-2 log-likelihood 315 318 310
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.05 0.04 0.08
N 50 50 50
Note: Entries represent negative binomial coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The
omitted (baseline) category for the USA is strictly unified government (where the president
has not only a majority in both chambers but over 60% in the Senate).
***P < 0.001; **P < 0.01; *P < 0.05
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These results are also confirmed in the French case, as shown in Table 7.
Negative and significant coefficients are associated with DG, divided
executive (usually understood as cohabitation) as well as divided legisla-
ture. When the various types of DG are introduced, the signs are system-
atically negative, though not in a clean and predictable order and not
always significantly so. Finally, we found no compelling evidence in favor
of the veto player hypothesis. Cohesiveness generally shows no signifi-
cant effect. Internal distance within the majority only affects negatively the
number of key laws when DG is operationalized as a divided executive.
Distance does show a significant effect but in different directions. In three
of the models, during DG, as distance between majority and opposition
increases, the number of key laws increases too. This is in direct opposi-
tion to the expectations derived from the veto player hypothesis.
Discussion
These results confirm Mayhew’s Divided We Govern idea of the normalcy
of DG and extend the analysis both geographically by including France
and theoretically by distinguishing among various levels of division that
may be present, and by distinguishing between legislative productivity in
general and the production of important laws. The findings are also con-
sistent with a view of lawmaking that places emphasis on problem
solving. Most of the governments’ legislative activity consists in insuring
TABLE 7
Predicting Policy Change in France, 1979–2008
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 1.80*** (0.29) 2.51*** (0.27) 2.38*** (0.32) 2.43*** (0.23)
Session length 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Leg. election -0.33** (0.13) -0.31* (0.12) -0.29* (0.14) -0.32** (0.12)
Divided -0.71* (0.33)
Divided executive -1.25** (0.39)
Divided legislature -0.76* (0.37)
Formally unified gov. -0.77 (0.58)
Weakly divided gov. -0.47 (0.42)
Strongly divided gov. -0.60* (0.29)
Distance 0.03*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
Cohesiveness -0.01 (0.01) -0.08*** (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03)
Divided * Distance -0.03** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03* (0.01)
AIC 35.43 35.32 35.30 35.67
-2 log-likelihood 233 232 240 235
McFadden’s pseudo-R2 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.18
N 33 33 33 33
Note: Entries represent negative binomial coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The dependent
variable is the number of key laws per month of parliamentary session. The inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable does not affect the results presented above but increases the pseudo-R2.
***P < 0.001; **P < 0.01; *P < 0.05
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the normal functioning of the political system and in responding to the
issue of the day and other sudden exogenous crises. Whether their moti-
vation is self-interested (publicizing their achievements to their electors)
or driven by the common good, politicians do play this role. The results of
our analyses of overall legislative productivity (Tables 4 and 5) show this
quite clearly. Whatever the partisan of institutional configuration, what-
ever the setting (USA or France), governments govern.
In fact, the only true determinants of legislative productivity in the USA
and France over the period under scrutiny have to do with constraints in
the legislators’ ability to do their work. U.S. lawmakers legislate less
during the first year as they concentrate on their other activity, oversight.
French legislators legislate less when they are given less time to do so
(either because of shorter legislative sessions or the occurrence of elec-
tions). Hence, declines in overall legislative productivity havemuch less to
do with partisan bickering and cross-institution tensions as with outside
constraints put on the workload of lawmakers.
Moreover, our results show important nuances in the different values of
the French and American systems. Indeed, the data show that key policy
change by and large happens when a unified executive is able to push
through reforms without opposition. The critical results in Tables 6 and 7
are that the production of key laws is heightened under strictly unified
government, and similar findings hold in both countries. This highlights
the “decisiveness” of such institutional–political configurations. However,
it does not imply that these decisions will have the capacity to stick over
the long term. This institutional–political configuration, however, lacks
“resoluteness,” that is, the ability to commit to established policy decisions
(Cox and McCubbins 2001, 22). However, it also indicates that, even in
France, where the concept of checks and balances is not at the core of the
institutions, institutional and partisan configurations can block some key
legislation pushed by the majority.
Whereas our empirical focus has been on the USA and France, our
findings may have broader relevance. The question at the core of the
literature on DG has been to know if rivals can govern together, or if it
leads to stalemate. Looking at two widely different institutional and cul-
tural settings, we have shown first that truly unified government is rare,
that some form of working “across the aisle” is common in both countries,
and that while it has some impact on the production of major policy
change, by nomeans can it be said to create paralysis. These findings could
stimulate further studies in a range of institutional situations beyond the
U.S.-focused definition of DG.
Our article also answers the Mayhew question from a novel perspec-
tive. As we pointed out in our review of the literature, Mayhew’s study
has been questioned on its operationalization of important laws and on his
findings. We have provided amore generalizable conceptualization of DG,
one that recognizes its various forms and that can be applied to a range of
constitutional structures. By arguing that DGs came in different types, we
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were able to specify how each institutional actor may affect lawmaking.
We also point out how rare truly unified government actually is, in the
USA or in France. Hence, if Mayhew’s clever title Divided We Govern was
meant to argue that there was no more gridlock under unified and DG
periods, we could not agree more. We do reach a different finding than
Mayhew in that we find landmark policy change occurs more often under
(strongly) unified government than under any form of shared control.
More generally, his argument that DG is something close to the normal
state of things, and therefore cannot be seen to make governing impos-
sible, proves accurate for the case of France as well as the USA. The USA
has known strongly unified government for only 6 of the last 64 years, and
France for just 14 of the last 33. Divided We Govern, indeed.
Notes
1. Before 1975, two-thirds of the “present and voting” senators had to agree to
end debate and stop a filibuster. In 1975, the threshold was lowered to
three-fifths of the “duly chosen and sworn” senators. So the filibuster point
moved from 66 to 60 in that year.
2. Senate elections in France are indirect, with local elected officials dominating
the electoral college, and this overrepresentation of rural areas explains the
consistent rightward tilt in the Senate’s political ideology. Nonetheless, the
balance tilted toward the left for the first time in more than 50 years in
September 2011. As our data on legislative productivity do not cover the
current legislature, we do not analyze this situation. However, it reinforces
our point that the patterns of divided and unified control are more compli-
cated than is commonly assumed.
3. Article 10 states: “The President of the Republic shall promulgate Acts of
Parliament within fifteen days following the final passage of an Act and its
transmission to the Government. Hemay, before the expiry of this time limit,
ask Parliament to reopen debate on the Act or any sections thereof. Such
reopening of debate shall not be refused.”
4. That is, laws related to the organization of the state apparatus.
5. Even if less widespread in France than in the USA, some laws are designed
with explicit sunset provisions. For example, in 1994, three bioethics laws
were passed with the provision that they be revised after 10 years. When
they were revised in 2004 and in 2011, the revision was set at 7 years later (La
documentation française 2011).
6. In France, legislative and presidential elections have taken place in the
middle of the year, and the two elections usually take place at different
times. Election years being truncated years, we have two data points for
these years. For example, 1993–1 denotes the preelection period of 1993 and
1993–2 the postelection period. The number of laws enacted in 1993 is there-
fore split between laws enacted before the legislative elections and laws
enacted after these elections. In the analysis, we measure productivity per
month.
7. As we have mentioned earlier, organic laws are laws related to the organi-
zation of the state apparatus.
8. Organic laws are automatically referred for constitutional review. This is
why we only kept organic laws that have been adopted by a public vote.
9. The Conference des Presidents includes the Speaker of the National Assem-
bly, the six vice-speakers, the leaders of the parliamentary party caucuses,
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the presidents of legislative committees, and other members of the
Chamber. The government is represented by one of its members, customar-
ily the minister in charge of relations with Parliament.
10. Assemblée Nationale website at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/
connaissance/collection/6.asp accessed January 29, 2010.
11. The mean between strictly and formally unified governments is significant
at P = 0.03, between strictly unified and weakly divided governments at
P = 0.001, strictly unified and strongly divided governments at P = 0.077.
12. The results are averaged per month to take into account the variable length
of the legislative session.
13. We also include a “time” variable to control for the long-term downward
trend in U.S. law production.
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